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**African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
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**THE QUARTERLY
AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN
QATB**

Third Quarter

1st July - 30th September 2022

African Union 20 YEARS



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Strengthening Resilience in Nutrition & Food Security on the African continent:
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Edition No:003, October 2022

ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN

In line with its mandate to assist African Union (AU) Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to build their Counter-Terrorism capacities and to Prevent Violent Extremism, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has developed tools that enable it to collect, analyse, process, and disseminate information on terrorism-related incidents occurring in Africa. One of the products of this effort is the quarterly Africa Terrorism Bulletin (ATB) that is published by the Centre.

The Q-ATB seeks to keep AU Member State Policymakers, Researchers, Practitioners and other stakeholders in the fields of Counter-Terrorism (CT) and the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), updated quarterly, on the trends of terrorism on the Continent.

Notwithstanding the lack of a universally accepted common definition of **Terrorism**, the AU, in its **1999 OAU CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM, Article 1 paragraph 3, (a) and (b), and Article 3**, defines what constitutes a **Terrorist Act**. The ACSRT and therefore the QATB defer to this definition.

ABOUT THE ACSRT/CAERT

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established as a structure of the African Union in 2004. The decision to establish the Centre was taken in 2002 as part of the AU Plan of Action (PoA) to Prevent and Combat of Terrorism. Its primary role is to assist AU member States build their Counter-Terrorism capacities. Its mandate includes the conduct of research, analysis and studies on the terrorism situation and terrorist groups in Africa, maintaining a terrorism database, centralizing information on terrorism and sharing this with AU Member States. The Centre conducts assessment missions to various AU Member States in order to ascertain their Counter-Terrorism capability and compliance with International Legal instruments and then provide advice on what needs to be done. In its capacity building effort, the Centre conducts seminars, workshops, and training sessions in various aspects of Counterterrorism for Member States and facilitates the drafting of their Counter-Terrorism legislation, strategies, and Plans of Action in accordance with human rights requirements.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia; transformed to African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (<i>ATMIS</i>)
AMM	Africa Media Monitor
ANP	Armée Nationale Populaire
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AS	Al-Shabaab
ASWJ	Al Sunna WaJammah
AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
CAERT	Centre Africain d'Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme
CAR	Central African Republic
CT	Counter-Terrorism
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EUC-JRC	European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre
FAMA	Forces Armées Maliennes
FDPC	Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain
GFSN	Groupement des Forces pour la sécurisation du Nord
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IS	Islamic State (co-called)
ISCAP	Islamic State Central African Province
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISS	Islamic State in Somalia
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JNIM	Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
KUBN	Uqba Ibn-Nafi Battalion
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Forces
MINUSMA	Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali
MSA	Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad
NISA	National Intelligence Service Agency (Somalia)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PBIEDs	Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
RCIEDs	Remotely Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanism
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SNA	Somalia National Army
UNSMIL	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Libya
US	United States (of America)
VE groups	Violent Extremist groups

SUMMARY

General Situation. 1st July 2022 to 30th September 2022 recorded 388 terrorist attacks that resulted in over 2,391 deaths across Africa. Attacks increased by 21%, but there was a decline in resultant deaths by 8% in comparable to second quarter (Q2). Q2 recorded 320 attacks and 2,588 deaths. In terms of monthly trend, August recorded the highest number of attacks compared to that of September and July. Even though August recorded the highest number of attacks, in terms of casualties, the month recorded the lowest number of deaths for the period. With respect to casualties, July recorded the highest number of deaths. While there were 752 deaths recorded in September and 729 deaths in August, 910 deaths were recorded in July, representing 17% and 20% decline in September and August deaths respectively, when compared to the deaths recorded in July.

Countries Most Affected. The five countries most affected by terrorist attacks during the period were: Somalia, Burkina Faso, DRC, Nigeria, and Mozambique (in decreasing order).

Targets of Terrorist Attacks. While 187 out of the 388 terrorist attacks were launched against Civilians, 163 targeted Military/Security Forces. 21 attacks targeted International Organizations and 17 attacks targeted Governmental Institutions/Officials. The attacks by ASWJ, ISGS, Boko Haram, and ADF/ISCAP were mainly against Civilians, whilst Al-Shabaab, JNIM, and ISWAP mostly targeted Military/Security Forces.

Weapons Used. The terrorist groups used Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in 263 out of the 388 attacks, IEDs were used in 101 of the attacks, mixed attacks (IED & SALW) were 6 and 18 kidnapping cases.

Deaths from Terrorists Attacks. 2,391 deaths were recorded during the period: 1,198 civilians, 577 Military/Security personnel and 616 terrorists.

Casualties Inflicted by Terrorist Groups. Al-Shabaab killed 396 persons (203 civilians, 193 Military/Security Forces); ADF/ISCAP killed 186 persons (178 civilians, 8 Military/Security Forces); ISGS killed 180 persons (130 civilians, 50 Military/Security Forces); JNIM killed 163 persons (129 civilians, 34 Military/Security Forces); ASWJ killed 116 persons (40 Civilians, 76 Military/Security Forces); Other IS Affiliates killed 74 persons (19 civilians and 55 Military/Security Forces); Boko Haram killed 67 persons (60 civilians and 7

(12 Civilians, 27 Military/Security Forces), and Ansaroul Islam killed 15 persons (all civilians). Unknown groups killed 542 persons (383 civilians, 159 Military/Security).

Casualties Sustained by Terrorist Groups. JNIM, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, ISGS, ISWAP and ADF/ISCAP suffered highest number of casualties during the period. Military/Security forces killed 295 of JNIM fighters, 142 Al-Shabaab members, 137 of Boko Haram and 115 ISGS terrorist members. Others ISWAP suffered 99 deaths and ADF/ISCAP suffered 43 casualties. 349 members of other unknown groups were also killed.

Kidnapping. 18 cases of kidnappings were recorded. A total of 759 persons were taken hostage in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger while 21 captives were released during the same period.

Focus on Epicentres. Out of the 388 terrorist attacks resulting in 2,391 deaths, the Sahel region recorded 57 attacks with 780 deaths, the Lake Chad Basin recorded 83 attacks with 395 deaths, the Great Lakes region accounted for 41 attacks and 316 deaths and Horn of Africa region accounted for 95 attacks with 499 deaths during the period.

High Profile Attacks.


- **20 July, Aato and Yeed, Bekool, Somalia.** Al-Shabaab militants attacked Liyu police camp along the Somali Ethiopia border killing 17 Ethiopian Police forces. Ethiopian National Defense Forces repulsed the attack killing a total of 63 of the al-Shabaab fighters.
- **07 August, Tessit, Gao, Mali.** At least 42 Malian soldiers were killed by suspected ISGS militants using drones and artillery in attack on a military post at Tessit. 22 other soldiers were injured, and 37 terrorists were killed in reprisal attack.
- **06 September, Talataye, Gao, Mali.** Suspected ISGS militants attacked Movement for Salvation of Azawad (MSA). At least 62 people were killed comprising 20 MSA fighters and 42 civilians.
- **01 July, Ajata, Niger, Nigeria.** Unidentified gunmen attacked a mining site. At least 54 people comprising 48 security and six civilians were killed while scores of residents and Chinese nationals were also abducted.

26 August, Ndindulo, North Kivu, DRC. Suspected ADF/ISCAP militants attacked the village. At least 40 civilians were killed and 76 kidnapped in the attack.


Counter-Terrorism Response. CT operations resulted in neutralizing 1,772 terrorists. Three Military/Security Forces died during those operations across the continent.

Conclusions/Recommendations. The general number of terrorist attacks increased significantly for the third quarter. This demonstrates freedom of movement of terrorist groups within their mobility corridors. There was, however, a marginal decline in the number of deaths recorded. Analysis of the situation shows a deteriorating security in Africa, as evident by the number of terrorist attacks, an indication that terrorist activities are far from abating. Given the threat levels, a continental collaboration/cooperation mechanism that seeks to appropriately coordinate strategic/operational CT/PCVE efforts would be sine quo non in addressing the threats stemming from Terrorism.


1ST Quarter Vrs 2ND Quarter Vrs 3RD Quarter




Type of Attacks




Primary Targets of Attacks



Deaths per Category



Regional Attacks & Deaths



GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Background: Terrorism, Insurgency, and violent extremism have continued to be the primary threats to peace, security, national stability, and development on the African continent. The geography of terrorism and insurgency in Africa has dramatically increased over the past decade, and in more particular the last five years. Regions that previously did not perceive the seriousness of the threat, or were considered to be immune from terrorism, have been targeted by terrorist groups. The threats have remained resolute both in intent and capability, with growing confidence and cohesion in the launching of devastating attacks on civilians, security forces, and critical infrastructure across the continent. The terrorism phenomenon has developed into a complex mix of ideology-driven acts of violence, transnational organized crime, and insurgency. This is manifested in the multiplicity of armed groups with varying motives and trajectories that are spreading and unleashing violence across the African continent.

Objective: The objective of the Africa Terrorism Bulletin is to provide a quarterly assessment of terrorism and violent extremism situation and trends on the continent. This is aimed at providing African Union Member States up to date information on terrorism incidents and its related activities. The data for the analysis of this Bulletin, is limited to information open-source information collected and stored in the ACSRT Database, in conformity with the definition of terrorist acts as defined by the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

Database: The ACSRT maintains a robust database that stores information on terrorism, more specifically, on terrorist groups, their leaders and members, and activities and avails this information to the African Union Commission, the African Union Member States, Regional Economic Communities, and relevant Regional Mechanisms. In the framework of its Continental Counter-Terrorism Early Warning System (ACSRT CT-CEWS), information for the Database is collected by the ACSRT Situation-Room using the Africa Media Monitor (AMM) developed in collaboration with the African Union Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Situation-Room in the AU Commission and the European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) for advanced web mining and information extraction. With the AMM, the ACSRT Situation Room scans and accesses over 1400 websites 24/7 and retrieves real time open-source information on terrorist incidents. The Centre also stores terrorism-related information received from Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and relevant Regional Mechanisms (RMs) based on existing cooperation agreements. The AU Continental Early Warning Situation-Room and reports from AU Field Missions and other field missions are also sources of information for the bulletin.

Validation: To ensure credibility and reliability, the Centre validates all accessed terrorism incidents from the ACSRT National and Regional Focal Points. The Focal Points are the institutions in AU Members and RECs/RMs designated to collaborate and share terrorism and Counter-Terrorism related information with the ACSRT. In accordance with its mandate, the information validated by the ACSRT on the number of attacks, deaths and injuries recorded are considered as the official data for the ACSRT Database irrespective of other conflicting figures.

THREAT UPDATE

The threat of terrorism in Africa continue to increase during the third quarter (Q3) of 2022. From 1st of July to 30th September 2022, 388 terrorist attacks and 2391 resultant deaths were recorded, with the month of July recording 130 attacks and 910 deaths, in August 132 attacks and 729 deaths recorded while in September 126 attacks leading to 752 deaths were recorded. When compared to the second quarter (Q2) where 320 attacks and 2588 deaths were registered, the Q3 witnessed 21% increase in attacks and 8% decline in deaths.

Out of the 388 attacks recorded during the third quarter, 187 were against Civilian targets, 163 were against the Military/security, 21 targeted International Organizations while 17 were against Government Institutions. Most victims of terrorism and violent extremism are indeed innocent civilians. During the reporting period, 1,198 civilians lost their lives, 577 military/security personnel and 616 terrorists were killed during terrorist attacks while additional 1,772 terrorists were neutralised during counter-terrorism operations across the continent. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) continue to be the major means by which terrorist attacks. SALWs were used in 263 attacks, 101 attacks were carried out using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and 18 cases of kidnapping were reported. Although the record shows SALWs as the most favoured weapon of choice, there is significant increase in the use of IEDs terrorist attacks, particularly in the West Africa. As compared to the preceding period, the third quarter recorded 110% increase in IED attacks across the continent. The proliferation of IEDs could possibly indicate shared expertise, increasing coordination and cooperation between terrorist groups. High usage of IEDs by terrorist groups could also be a self-preserving tactic that allows low-cost and high-impact attacks amid constant counter terrorism operations and measures that seek to interrupt terrorism recruitment and radicalization.

The five deadliest groups, Al-Shabaab, Allied Democratic Force (ADF), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Jamaat Nasrat al-Islam Muslimeen (JNIM) and Al-Sunna Wa Jammah (ASWJ) were responsible for 50% of the total attacks 38% of deaths committed in the third quarter across the continent. On the other hand; JNIM, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, ISGS, ISWAP and ADF/ISCAP in the descending order, suffered the highest number of casualties during the period in counter terrorism offensives. Somalia, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Mozambique, has set the countries as the most terrorism affected during the period under review.

East and Horn of Africa. The region was the most affected during the reporting period. It recorded 102 attacks that led to 584 deaths. This implies a drastic increase of 325% in attacks as well as 201% in number of deaths when comparing to Q2. **Kenya** recorded six attacks, while the rest were carried out in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, known to target hotels and eateries across **Somalia**, echoed its modus operandi on 19 August when it detonated a car bomb and raided Hayat hotel, usually frequented by government officials, killing 21 civilians and injuring 117 others. While the group has suffered severe losses during Q1 due to robust counter terrorism offensives, it appears the group resuscitated its operations where a drastic upsurge in attacks was recorded during Q2 particularly in the month of September 2022.

Earlier on, in August 2022 al-Qaeda (central) dedicated the seventh issue of its magazine, al-Ummah al-Wahida to Somalia indicating that its affiliate, al-Shabaab, would soon be victorious, overthrow the government and take over Mogadishu and as a result expel foreign forces from Somalia. This was followed by a major surge in number of attacks and resultant deaths during the month of September. Most of the September attacks were predominantly against military establishment. For instance, the group attacked US-trained Danab Special Forces and Turkish-trained Gorgor commandos in Hiraan region killing 40 Somali soldiers. A sudden spike of attacks could indicate, in general, a concerted influence that global terrorist groups have over the character and conduct of Africa-based terrorist groups; it could solely take a public recognition to have a complete turn of events. Around the same period al-Shabaab reportedly posted a picture of its soldier meddling with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), thus confirming allegations that the group could be

using drones in its operations. Given the dramatic increase of attacks in the month of September, it can be asserted that UAVs could have used to conduct and coordinate attacks.

Lake Chad Basin. During the reporting period the four-affected countries of Lake Chad Basin recorded 83 attacks and 395 resultant deaths, which marked an increase of 17% in number of attacks and a significant decline of 22% in number of deaths. **Nigeria** was the most affected registering 66 number of attacks and 298 deaths. Boko Haram continue to expand more inland beyond its primary area of operation, Lake Chad Basin. In **Niger**, although Diffa region was the most affected, Niamey registered yet another attack on 11 August suspected to have been carried out by JNIM militants, where an explosion claimed two civilian lives. Considering the complexity associated with conducting urban terrorism, and for JNIM to be able to penetrate Niamey for the second time within a short period of time, demonstrate the rising capabilities of JNIM. The evolving trend may continue if security forces do not act to boost its intelligence capabilities in Niamey. In **Cameroon**, Boko Haram continue to launch infrequent attacks in Far-north region, on average about three attacks per month, targeting mainly civilians. During the reporting period, **Chad** recorded one attack in August when Boko Haram militants attacked a military post killing two soldiers.

Sahel Belt of West Africa. During the reporting period, the region recorded 57 attacks resulting in 780 deaths. Although the Sahel belt of West Africa recorded the highest number of deaths, there was a significant decline compared to the preceding reporting period where the region recorded 82 attacks and 1055 deaths. This marks 30% reduction in attacks and a significant decline of 26% in deaths. **Burkina Faso** was the most affected country in the region. The growing usage of IEDs in Burkina Faso is of great concern. Terrorists are now committing IED attacks against critical infrastructure causing devastating effect. During the reporting period, suspected JNIM militants destroyed Nare and Wousse bridges linking major towns using IEDs, as a result disrupting movement of people and goods, and also isolating communities.

Nationwide protests in Burkina Faso culminated into yet another military coup led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré on 30 September 2022. Capt. Traoré justified his seizure of power over deteriorating security situation and vowed to address the growing terrorism violence in the country. Coup d'état by nature sow divisions within security forces, consequently, the forces might shift their focus towards internal squabbles over national security demands. Political instability and the ever-rising threat of terrorism in Burkina Faso, make the country a gateway to terrorism into coastal countries. In **Mali**, ISGS terrorist group actively carried out complex and well-coordinated attacks during the reporting period. On 7 August ISGS attacked a military post in Gao region using drones and artillery, as a result 42 Malian soldiers were killed while on 06 September, the group attacked the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) killing 62 people comprising 20 MSA fighters and 42 civilians in Gao region, and about 13,000 people were also displaced.

Coastal States of West Africa. The coastal states of West Africa, in particular, Benin and Togo continue to experience spillover of terrorist attacks from JNIM and ISGS terrorist groups. These groups cross from Northern Burkina Faso and Niger. In **Benin**, sporadic attacks launched by militants linked to JNIM around Alibori and Atakora departments have resulted in the deaths of many civilians and security forces alike. Due to increasing violence, Benin has committed to strengthen its capacity to fight terrorism. In July 2022 talks were held with Rwanda to provide logistical support and expertise. Rwandan contingent of 350 troops is expected arrive in northern Benin to help stabilise areas affected by terrorism. In **Togo**, an upsurge in violence continues in the northern Savanes region bordering Burkina Faso. In July, a village was raided resulting in 12 civilians' deaths and two Togolese soldiers were also killed in a separate incident. In August, an IED was used targeting security patrol team, killing a soldier and injuring 12 others. Notwithstanding the steady spate of terrorist attacks, the government has exercised some counter initiatives. Some of the responses include enhanced border security, an inter-ministerial committee was also established mainly to interact and encourage young people who are susceptible to terrorism recruitment, and Togo also play an active part of the Accra Initiative, which is committed to address terrorism and violent extremism in the coastal states.

Great Lakes Region. The most active groups during the reporting period were ADF/Islamic State Central Africa Republic and CODECO both operating in Ituri, North and South Kivu provinces. The currently popular M23, due to clashes between the governments of DRC and Rwanda over alleged Rwandan support to the group, limited its sporadic attacks around Rutshuru territory of North-Kivu province. The region recorded 73 terrorist attacks that led to 427 deaths whereas in the preceding period 36 attacks and 461 deaths were recorded implying 102% drastic increase in attacks and slight decline of 7% in number of deaths. The security situation in eastern **DRC** remains dire. On 26 August in North-Kivu, ADF raided a village killing 40 civilians and kidnapping 76 others. The group also conducted its newfangled modus operandi of conducting prisonbreaks. ADF militant attacked Kakwangura Central Prison in Beni, North-Kivu killing three officers and letting more than 800 prisoners escape, including 12 ADF members.

While the security situation in the DRC continue to deteriorate in the presence of multiple intervening forces, that include the Congolese force (FARDC), Ugandan forces, SADC Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and United Nations Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO), that aim to assist in the fight against growing violence in eastern DRC, more intervening forces are expected to arrive. Shortly after the DRC joined the East Africa Community (EAC) block in March 2022, in June the regional bloc took a decision to deploy its regional forces, for the first time since its inception, to eastern DRC. In August, Burundian contingent under the EAC was the first to arrive in the country and in September, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi announced imminent arrival of Kenyan forces under EAC arrangement. The greatest disadvantage of multiple intervening forces is lack of coordination that often leads to prolonged conflict. How EAC intends to make an impact in a seemingly saturated environment could depend on its approach and coordination with the forces already operating on the ground.


Southern Africa. In the third quarter of year, Southern Africa region recorded 49 attacks that led to 160 deaths in Mozambique alone, this translates to a 09% increase in number of attacks and 45% marginal increase in number of deaths when compared to the second quarter. Notably, ASWJ operations continue to spread to new areas within **Mozambique** despite the ongoing military intervention. During the first half of year, violence reached for the first time, Ancuabe and Chiure districts of Cabo Delgado and traversed into neighboring province of Nampula in Memba district. An additional district of Nampula, Eráti, also bordering Cabo Delgado, was for the first time hit during the reporting period. In Memba and Eráti districts, two churches and more than 120 houses were set on fire, four civilians were beheaded and people were taken hostage by ASWJ terrorists during the month of September. The increasing violence has caused displacement of population and a bulging humanitarian crisis. While ASWJ expansion to new areas could be adjudicated to the pressure extorted through counter terrorism offensives, the expansion could be a deliberate intention to undermine military intervention, or a demonstration of capabilities and resilience. The use of Islamic State (IS-Core) propaganda is becoming more and more common within ASWJ operations, the group claimed responsibility even over new attacks in Eráti and Memba districts. As a tactic to augment its material supply, ASWJ increasingly launch attacks against Mozambican forces (FDS) and seize a significant cache of weapons.

North Africa and the Maghreb. All the 28 attacks and 75 deaths recorded in the region were registered in **Egypt**, concentrated mainly in central and western Sinai-Peninsula. In comparison to the preceding period, the number of attacks remain the same while deaths increased by 14%. Islamic State – Sinai Peninsula (IS-SP) continue launch attacks against Egyptian army and Sinai Tribal Union. Reports indicate the remilitarization of Sinai, partly, that came to light around June 2022, further defying the 1979 Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty that declared Sinai a demilitarized buffer zone and regulated the number of soldiers Egypt could deploy in that area. This could bolster counter-terrorism operations against IS-SP and other insurgents groups operating in Sinai-Peninsula and significantly reduce terrorist activities.


NUMERICAL DATA: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS



Terrorism Related Attacks in Africa, July- September 2022



AFRICA TERRORISM INCIDENTS MAP: FROM 01 JUL -30 SEP. 2022




Map 2: Terrorism Attacks from 1st July to 30th September 2022: Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

1. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks:

A total of 388 terrorism incidents including 18 cases of kidnapping were recorded from 1st July to 30th September 2022.


Figure 1: Trend in Terrorist Attacks: Jul.- Sep. 2022



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

2. Terrorist Attacks by Region

Figure 2: Percentage per Region




Number of Attacks per Region:

- West Africa: **136**
- East Africa: **102**
- Central Africa: **73**
- Southern Africa: **49**
- North Africa: **28**


Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

3. Trends in Regional Terrorist Attacks



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

4. Type of Attacks



Type of Attacks:

- SALWs: **263**
- IEDs: **101**
- Mixed (IED&SALW): **06**
- Kidnapping: **18**

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

5. Type of Attacks by Terrorist Groups


Table 1: Types of Attacks by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	SALW	IED	Mixed	Kidnapping	Comments
Al-Shabaab	38	50	2	-	Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) constituted the major means of attack by Al-Shabaab for the period under review. 50 out of the 90 attacks were done using IEDs, 38 SALW and 2 mixed.
ASWJ	32	-	-	-	All attacks by the ASWJ were carried out using SALWs.
Other IS Affiliates ⁺	16	16	-	-	Other IS Affiliates carried out 16 attacks using SALWs and responsible for 16 cases of kidnappings.
JNIM	16	9	1	-	JNIM attacks are predominately carried out using SALWs. 16 out of the 26 attacks were SALW. Significant number of IEDs were also used, 9 cases were recorded, and one kidnapping.
ISWAP	15	4	1	3	ISWAP carried out 15 attacks using SAWL and another 4-attacks using IED, 3 kidnappings, and 1 mixed (IED & SALWs).
ADF/ISCAP	23	-	-	-	All attacks by the ADF/ISCAP were carried out using SALWs
Boko Haram	15	1	-	1	Boko Haram attacks are predominately carried out using SALWs. 15 out of the 17 attacks were SALW
ISGS	8	1	1	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) constituted majority of means of attacks by ISGS.
Ansaroul Islam	1	-	-	-	Ansaroul Islam carried out only one attack and SALW was used.
Unidentified Groups*	99	17	1	14	Unidentified groups used SALWs in majority of the attacks. In 99 out of 131 attacks by these groups, SALWs were used. They used IEDs in 17 attacks, 6 mixed attacks. They were also responsible for 18 cases of kidnappings.
TOTAL	263	101	06	18	

⁺ Other Islamic State (IS) Affiliates are all splinter IS affiliated groups mainly operating in the North Africa Region including Sinai Peninsula (IS-SP- Egypt) and Southern Libya.

* Unidentified Groups are all terrorist attacks carried out by the various known terrorist groups operating in Africa, but either did not claim responsibility for the attacks, or security forces did not attribute the attack to any group. Even though, the attacks might have taken place in an operational theatre of a known terrorist group, without claiming of responsibility by the group or attribution by Security Forces or ACSRT Analysts, it is left as Unidentified Groups. In addition, Violent Extremists groups such as Separatists in the Anglophone Region of Cameroon, Banditry activities in Northwestern Nigeria, whose attacks have been conveniently classified as terrorist act by the Member States concerned are captured under Unidentified Groups.


Figure 5: Types of Attacks by Terrorist Groups



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

6. Primary Targets

Figure 6: Primary Targets of Attacks



Primary Targets

- Civilians: **187**
- Military/Security Forces: **163**
- International Organization: **21**
- Government Institutions/Officials: **17**

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


7. Terrorist and Groups and their Primary Targets

Table 2: Details of Terrorist groups and their Primary Targets

Terrorist Groups	Civilians	Military/ Security	Gov't Inst./ Of.	Int. Org.	Comments
Al-Shabaab	27	38	11	14	Al-Shabaab carried out 27 attacks against civilians, 38 attacks against Military/Security Forces. They also carried out 11 attacks against Government Institutions/Officials, while 14 attacks on international organizations including ATMIS (AMISOM).
ASWJ	20	9	-	3	Civilians bore the brunt of all attacks perpetrated by ASWJ in Northern Mozambique. 20 out of 32 attacks targeted civilians, 9 against military/security and 3 against SADC SAMIM
Other IS Affiliates	11	19	1	1	Other IS Affiliates targeted security forces most in their attacks. The group carried out 11 attacks against civilians and 19 attacks against Military/Security Forces, one each against international organization (AMISOM/ATMIS) and government officials.
JNIM	11	16	-	-	JNIM focused majority of its attacks during the period on Military and other security forces. A total of 16 out of the 27 attacks of the group targeted military/security while 11 were against civilians.
ISWAP	8	14	1	-	Majority of ISWAP attacks targeted Military and Security Forces. 14 attacks targeted Military/security while 8 targeted civilians, and 1 against Government.
ADF/ISCAP	15	8	-	-	Majority of ADF/ISCAP attacks were against civilians. Out of 23 attacks, 15 attacks targeted civilians while 8 targeted security forces.
Boko Haram	8	16	-	-	JNIM focused majority of its attacks during the period on Military and other security forces. A total of 16 out of the 22 attacks of the group targeted military/security.
ISGS	7	3	-	-	ISGS carried out seven attacks against civilians and three attacks against Military/Security Forces.
Ansaroul Islam	1	-	-	-	The one attack carried out by Ansaroul Islam was against civilians
Unidentified groups	74	51	4	3	Attacks for which no group claimed responsibility mostly targeted civilians. 74 out of 132 attacks targeted civilians; 51 targeted Military/Security Forces, 4 targeted Government Institutions/Officials and 3 targeted International Organizations.
TOTAL	187	163	17	21	

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

Figure 7: Terrorist groups and their Primary Targets




Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


8. Total Deaths

A total of 2,391 terrorism related deaths were recorded from the 388 terrorist attacks from 1st July to 30th September. Also, 759 people were injured during the attacks.

Figure 8: Trend in Terrorism Related Deaths



9. Deaths per Category




Deaths per Category

- Civilians: **1,198**
- Military/Security Forces: **577**
- Terrorists: **616**

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

10. Deaths Per Region




Percentage of Deaths per Region

- **West Africa** recorded the highest number of deaths accounting for **48%** of all deaths for the period.
- **East Africa** recorded the second highest number of deaths accounting for **24%**.
- **Central Africa** recorded **18%** of deaths.
- **Southern Africa** recorded **7%** of deaths.
- **North Africa** recorded **3%** of deaths


Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

11. Trends in Regional Deaths



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


12. Regional Deaths by Categories



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

13. Deaths per Type of Attacks

Figure 13: Deaths per Type of Attacks



Deaths by Type of Attacks

- SALWs: **1957**
- IEDs: **325**
- Mixed (SALW & IED): **105**
- Kidnapping: **04**
 - **SALWs** accounted for **82%** of the deaths occasioned by terrorist attacks.
 - **14%** of deaths were as a result of **IED attacks**.
 - **4%** of deaths is attributed to complex attacks involving the use of **IEDs**, **SALWs** and **Kidnapping**.

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


14. Attacks and Casualties Inflicted per Terrorist Groups

Table 3: Attacks and Casualties by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	Number of Attacks	Number of Deaths	Comments
Al-Shabaab	90	396	Al-Shabaab carried out 90 attacks, killing 396 persons.
ASWJ	32	116	ASWJ carried out 32 attacks, killing 116 persons.
Other IS Affiliates	32	74	Other IS Affiliates carried out 32 attacks, killing 74 persons.
JNIM	26	163	JNIM carried out 26 attacks, killing 163 persons.
ISWAP	23	39	ISWAP carried out 23 attacks, killing 39 persons
ADF/ISCAP	23	186	ADF/ISCAP carried out 23 attacks, killing 186 persons.
Boko Haram	17	67	Boko Haram carried out 17 attacks, killing 67 persons
ISGS	10	180	ISGS carried out 10 attacks, killing 180 persons
Ansaroul Islam	1	15	Ansaroul Islam carried out 1 attack and killed 15 persons
Unidentified Groups	132	542	132 attacks were carried out by groups from which nobody claim responsibilities. These attacks added up to 542 deaths.
TOTAL	388	2391	

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

Figure 14: Casualties Inflicted by Terrorist groups



Source: ACSRT Database, 2020

15. Members of Terrorist Groups Killed (In Attacks and CT Operations)

Table 4: Details of Casualties Sustained by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	Number Killed	Comments
Al-Shabaab	454	454 Al-Shabaab members were killed.
ASWJ	10	10 ASWJ members were killed
Other IS Affiliates	101	In total 101 members of various IS Affiliates groups killed
JNIM	85	85 JNIM Members were killed
ISWAP	138	138 members of ISWAP were killed
ADF/ISCAP	37	37 terrorists killed were from ADF/ISCAP group.
Boko Haram	237	237 members of JNIM groups were killed
ISGS	116	116 members of ISGS groups were killed
Unidentified Groups	594	A total of 594 terrorists killed were from Unidentified groups.
TOTAL	1,772	

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

16. The Five Most Affected Countries


Table 5: Five Countries Most Affected

Country	Total Attacks	Total Deaths	Total injured
Somalia	95	499	369
Nigeria	66	298	50
Mozambique	49	161	30
DRC	41	316	49
Burkina Faso	34	363	92
TOTAL	285	1,637	590

Source: ACSRT Database, 2020

- **Nigeria** recorded the highest number of **attacks (68)** resulting in 486 deaths.
- **Mozambique** also recorded 45 attacks resulting in the **110** deaths.
- **Burkina Faso** recorded **38 attacks** resulting in **511** deaths.
- **DRC** recorded **35** attacks resulting in **503** deaths.
- **Mali** recorded the lowest number (**31**) among the five most affected countries for the period, resulting in 433 deaths

Figure 15: Five Most Affected Countries



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

TERRORISM ATTACKS

MOST FATAL ATTACKS

17. High Profile Attacks


Table 6: List of high-Profile Attacks

	Country	Place	Date	Group	Deaths	Description
1	Somalia	Bakool	20 July	AL-Shabaab	80	Al-Shabaab militants attacked Liyu police camp along the Somali Ethiopia border at Aato and Yeed killing 17 Ethiopian Police forces. Ethiopian National Defense Forces repulsed the attack killing a total of 63 of the al-Shabaab fighters.
2	Mali	Gao	07 August	ISGS	79	At least 42 Malian soldiers were killed by suspected ISGS militants using drones and artillery in attack on a military post at Tessit. 22 other soldiers were injured, and 37 terrorists were killed in reprisal attack.
3	Mali	Koulikoro	27 July	JNIM	63	Malian army came under attack in Mourdiah suspected to have been carried out by JNIM militants. At least 15 soldiers were killed, and 25 others injured. The troops also killed 48 militants and recovered three Pick-ups vehicles and weapons.
4	Mali	Gao	06 September	ISGS	62	Suspected ISGS militants attacked the group Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) at Talataye. At least 62 people were killed comprising 20 MSA fighters and 42 civilians
5	Nigeria	Niger	01 July	Unidentified Group	54	Unidentified gunmen attacked a mining site in the Ajata/Aboki. At least 54 people including 48 security operatives and six civilians were killed while scores of residents and Chinese nationals were also abducted during the attack on the site.
6	Burkina Faso	Oudalan	12 September	JNIM	49	Ambush by suspected JNIM armed men against a Burkinabe military unit, killed eight soldiers. The unit in reprisal attack killed 41 terrorists.
7	Burkina Faso	Bam	04 August	JNIM	47	Armed men believed to be JNIM militants ambushed the convoy of a unit of the Burkinabè army at Bourzanga, killing four soldiers and nine members of the Volunteer for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). 34 terrorists were killed in reprisal attack.
8	Mali	Gao	29 August	ISGS	44	Two Malian soldiers were killed, and eight others injured during clashes with ISGS militants in Tessit, close to the Burkina Faso and Niger borders. At least 42 militants were also eliminated in the clashes.
9	DRC	North Kivu	26 August	ADF/ISCAP	40	Suspected ADF militants attacked the Ndindulo village. At least 40 civilians were killed and 76 kidnapped in the attack.
10	Niger	Diffa	04 July	ISWAP	23	Six Nigerien soldiers were killed and 14 wounded after suspected ISWAP militants attacked the Blabrine military post, near the border with Chad. Reprisal attack also killed 17 assailants.

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

18. Attacks in Epicentres

Figure 16: Percentage of Attacks in Epicentres




Total Attacks in Epicentre: 276

- Horn of Africa: 95
 - Lake Chad Basin: 83
 - Sahel Region: 57
 - Great Lakes Region: 41
- Within the period under review, **Horn of Africa** recorded 24% attacks in Africa
 - **Lake Chad Basin** recorded 21% of all attacks
 - **Sahel Region** recorded 15% of all attacks
 - **Great Lakes Region** recorded 11% of all attacks that took place in the epicentres

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

19. Deaths Recorded in Epicentres

Figure 17: Deaths in Epicentres



Total Deaths in Epicentre: 2,111

- Sahel Region: 780
 - Horn of Africa: 584
 - Lake Chad Basin: 395
 - Great Lakes Region: 352
- Within the period under review, **Sahel region** recorded 33% of deaths in Africa
 - **Horn of Africa** recorded 24% of all deaths
 - **Lake Chad Basin** recorded 16% of all deaths
 - **Great Lakes Region** recorded 15% of all deaths that took place in Africa

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

EVALUATION OF DATA TREND: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

20. Attacks and Fatalities

The third quarter of 2022 recorded 388 terrorist attacks across the continent. For the period under review, the total number of resultant deaths in Africa was 2,391. Attacks increased by 21% but the number of deaths associated with the attacks decreased by 8% in comparable to the second quarter (Q2). Q2 recorded 320 attacks and 2,588 deaths. In terms of monthly trend, August (132) recorded the highest number of attacks and deaths compared to that of September (126) and July (130), indicating progressive increments when compared to July. However, the attacks in September reduced significantly when compared to that of August. With respect to casualties, July recorded the highest number of deaths. While there were 752 deaths recorded in September and 729 deaths in August, 910 deaths were recorded in July, representing 20% and 17% decline in August and September deaths respectively, when compared to the deaths recorded in July.

From the attacks and the associated deaths, it could be noted that despite the counter terrorism response generation efforts, terrorist structures remain resolute and potent on the African Continent for the 3rd Quarter. This is evident by the complexity and the sophistication of attacks by terrorist groups throughout the period. For example, on 4th July Six Nigerien soldiers were killed and 14 wounded after ISWAP militants attacked the Blabrine military post, near the border with Chad. Further, on 20th July, Al-Shabaab militants attacked Liyu police camp along the Somali Ethiopia border at Aato and Yeed killing 17 Ethiopian Police forces. The attacks continued in August where At least 42 Malian soldiers were killed, and 22 others injured by ISGS militants using drones and artillery in attack on a military post at Tessit on 7th August. In the month of September, ISGS militants attacked the group Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) at Talataye on 6th September. At least 62 people were killed comprising 20 MSA fighters and 42 civilians. Following that JNIM on the 12th September ambushed Burkinabe military unit, and killed eight soldiers. These incidences and many others recorded for the period accounted for the high number of attacks and fatalities for the 3rd Quarter. Clearly, across all regions various terrorist groups including Al-Shabaab, ISWAP, ISGS and JNIM exhibited resilient and great cohesion to cause devastating atrocities on security and civilians alike.

From the above data trend, there was a general increase in monthly attacks. The data also shows approximately 4 attacks per day, and each attack 6 deaths per attack is recorded within the third quarter. This lethality rate is, however, lower than those recorded in the Q2. The data trend further shows that, for the Q3, approximately 27 people were killed each day in Africa by terrorist and violent extremist groups. While Civilian casualties continue to be of great concern, the military/security casualties increased significantly for the period as compared to the Q2. Of the registered 2,391 deaths 1,198 were civilians, 577 were Military/Security Forces while 616 were terrorists. The number of men in uniform that fell on the battlefield increased by 25%. The number suggests that every day in Africa 6 security personnel is killed by terrorist groups, higher than the 5 recorded in the Q2. There is the need to re-strategize to completely reduce both civilian and military casualties, as the high number of casualties reduces the moral of the troops and undermine the confidence of the local population in the security forces to protect them.

21. Targets of Terrorist Attacks

Most attacks were against Civilian targets at 187 (48%), 163 (42%) were against Military/Security forces, 21 (6%) were against International Organizations while 17 (5%) targeted Government Institutions/Officials. While there was a decline in the attacks against civilians, the attacks on military, international organisations and government institutions recorded significant increase. Although, Civilians were mostly the targets of terrorist groups, the proportion of attacks against civilians decreased while that of the military/security forces, international organisations and government institutions increased. The civilian population continue to bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. In many of the local communities, the fear of being attack by terrorist groups have forced civilians to join the ranks of the terrorist groups to avoid being attacked.

This situation continues to complicate efforts by security forces to degrade the capacities of terrorist groups. The ability for security forces to provide protection for local communities and prevent terrorist groups from attacking them could go a long way to build community trust and enhance the relations between local communities and security forces. This will ultimately lead to collaboration and cooperation of local communities in the fight against terrorist group, and eventually results in their defeat. This is because, local communities and the population remain key in defeating terrorist groups and detecting their movement particularly along border communities. It is, therefore, important for security forces to win the heart and minds of the population, to cooperate in their efforts to flush out terrorist groups.

For International organisations, MINUSMA in Mali, the AMISOM/ATMIS in Somalia, and SADC SAMIM force in Northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado came under heavy attack. More than a total of 25 soldiers from Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya were killed in separate attacks by Al-Shabaab within the period. These soldiers are all deployed under the AMISOM/ATMIS command. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) also suffered significant casualties. These attacks may reflect a strategic shift in the insurgents' operations as they refocus on military and police targets to restock with materiel — and may have contributed to their ability to undertake the bigger raid on military positions. The SADC SAMIM one of the biggest of such attacks since Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops arrived in Mozambique last year.

The phenomenon of terrorist groups attacking critical infrastructure and soft targets have become rampant. The period witnessed increasing attacks on markets, churches, schools in local communities as well as attacks on telecommunication mast. Given the frequency in which these vulnerable targets are attacked, security forces in collaboration with religious and community leaders may have to enhance security and ensure the protection of churches, schools, and markets. Also, telecommunication companies particularly in Kenya and Burkina Faso will have to put in place adequate measures to provide physical security protection for their communication assets.

22. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) continue to be the most common type of attack, as it accounted for 67% of total attacks lower than those recorded in Q2 and resulted in 1,957 deaths. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) accounted for 26% of the attacks higher than those recorded in Q2 and led to 325 deaths, Mixed (SALWs and IEDs) accounted for 1% of the attacks causing 105 deaths while Kidnappings accounted for 5% of the attacks and resulted in 4 deaths. Most terrorist groups in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Great Lakes Region, and Northern Mozambique attacked using SALW. However, in the East and Horn of Africa as well as Northern Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, IED constituted the major means by which terrorist groups operating in the region attacked their targets.

Terrorist groups are in possession of different kinds of SALWs (handguns, automatic assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns etc), which they acquire through battle capture/loss from national custody, the legacy of previous conflict, state collapse, state-sponsored diversion, and movement between the Hotbed of arms proliferations. One of the dangers of SALWs proliferation is the ease with which they get into the hands of unscrupulous persons, violent extremists, and terrorists. Addressing the growing proliferation of SALW will require some fundamental understanding of the phenomenon. It is important to understand the situation with regard to SALWs in Africa. Comprehensive empirical analysis of the types of SALWs in circulation in Africa, their source, and key actors responsible for their proliferation within and into Africa is critical to the AU strategic vision of silencing guns as means of addressing the problem of violent conflicts in the continent. It is also very important to establish the nexus between SALWs proliferation and terrorism and violent extremism by examining what kind of SALWs are used by terrorist groups and violent extremists in Africa, and the source of these SALWs to offer a credible solution to their control.

The period witnessed a growing use of IEDs across the length and breadth of Africa. Clearly, the transfer of IED manufacturing capacities among the various groups cannot be discounted. Indeed, Al-Shabaab for a very long time demonstrated manufacturing capacity of IEDs. Over time, various groups in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region have also begun their use in a such a consistent manner. The ability to degrade the technological and manufacturing capabilities of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa could possibly curtail the transfer of such capabilities among terrorist groups on the continent. Al-Shabaab IED manufacturing capabilities is unmatched. The easy accessibility and availability of materials particularly in mining areas will have to be checked. Frequent technical training on the identification and destruction of IEDs should form an important component of contingent's pre-deployment trainings for peace keeping and peace support operations in Africa, especially in areas where activities of terrorist/violent extremist groups are rampant.

23. Terrorist Groups Activities

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaida group operating in the Horn of Africa came across as the group with highest number of terrorist attacks for the period. Despite the persistent counter terrorism operations by Somali national Army (SNA), AMISOM/ATMIS troops and resumption of counter terrorism operations by AFRICOM, the group remained resilient and carried out complex and sophisticated attacks against civilian and security forces alike. In Somalia the groups attacks were spread across many regions and province including Bay, Shabelle, Hiran, Gedo, and the Capital Mogadishu. The group also attacked Wajir, Mandera, Garissa, and Lamu counties of Kenya. In a rare incursion into Ethiopia, the group attacked Limu police officers killing 17 of the security. In all, Al-Shabaab carried out 90 attacks and killed 396 persons. Majority of the group's attack were executed using IED. Indeed, there is a renewed commitment among the SNA to defeat al-Shabaab. Enhancing the operation, tactical and intelligence capabilities of the troops could completely degrade the capabilities of al-Shabaab to maintain their controlled terrorises.

The **Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ)** terror group, based on Cabo Delgado, Northern Mozambique carried out the second highest attacks while the **Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)** recorded the second highest number of deaths. came across as the group with highest number of terrorist attacks for the period. ASWJ carried out 32 attacks and killed 116 persons, while only 10 recorded attacks by ISGS resulted in the deaths of 181 people. Clearly, in the Cabo Delgado province, ASWJ resurged in attacks and carried out a series of attacks against local villages, churches, and markets. Indeed, SADC SAMIM forces also suffered several attacks from the group. Defeating the terror group in Northern Mozambique will require proper coordination, collaboration and intelligence sharing among all deployed troops operation in the theatre. The ISGS on the other hand, has devised new technology and means in which it carries out its attack. For the period, the group employed the use of drones and targeted a military based in Mali killing 40 soldiers. This and many others accounted for the high fatalities resulting from the group's attack.

Jama'at Nustratal-Islam wal- Muslimeen (JNIM)/ Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate group that operates in the Sahel also exhibited great momentum and carried out devastated attacks on both civilian and security forces. The group carried out 26 attacks killing 163 persons. JNIM for the period focused its attacks on the security forces. In the Sahel, and now by extension in Coastal West Africa, JNIM enjoyed some freedom of movement within its mobility by expanding its activities into Northern Benin and Northern Togo. Disrupting JNIM's influence in the coastal states will have to involve some PVE measures that address the vulnerabilities of local communities. A human security response approach that addresses the local grievances and vulnerabilities of border communities could deny the group operating space and ensure community resilience. The **Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF)** now operating under the **Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)** killed 186 people from 23 attacks that it carried. Contrary to JNIM, civilians continue to suffer the brunt of ADF/ISCAP in the North-Kivu and Ituri provinces of Eastern DRC. While Kinetic CT Operations could degrade ADF/ISCAP's capabilities, the root causes of violent conflict in South and North Kivus as well as Ituris must be addressed.

Boko Haram and **Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP)** which both operates in LCB also carried out complex attacks against security, civilians, and soft targets. The attacks of the groups were limited to North-eastern Nigeria states of Borno, Yobe mainly, far North Region of Camerron, Diffa region of Niger and Southwest Chad. While Boko Haram killed 67 people from 17 attacks, ISWAP killed 39 people from 10 recorded attacks. The freedom of movement of Boko Haram and ISWAP top carry out attacks in the LCB is attributed to the degrading of the groups capability by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) each of which operates in their national territories with enhanced coordination and cooperation to defeat the terrorist groups. The renewed mandate of the MNJTF is expected to further degrade the terrorist groups capabilities and completely reduce the abilities to launch attacks. In the Northern Sinai however, the IS affiliated group continue to carry out attacks against Egyptian Army and civilian population in the local communities. Despite the numerous developmental initiatives, aimed at bringing back the displayed population to ensure economic activities, there has been resurgence of attacks in the Sinai Peninsula. Security forces will have to provide adequate security and reduce the attack to barest minimum to reassure the local population of their safety and protection from protracted attacks.

24. Focus on Epicentres

For the period under review, the **Horn of Africa** recorded the highest number of attacks (95), higher than those recorded in the Q2. However, the region recorded the second highest number of deaths (584) among the epicentres of terrorist and violent extremist activities. This represents a 295% increase in the number of attacks and 200% increase in the number of deaths over the previous reported period. The lethality rate for the Horn of Africa is 6 deaths per attack, same rate of deaths per attack for the entire continent and lower than the horn of Africa lethality rate recorded in Q2. The data trend reveals a deteriorating of the security situation in the Horn of Africa, mainly caused by Al-Shabaab and ISS hostilities and atrocities within despite deliberate CT efforts. Under the present circumstances, enhancing the operational capabilities of SNA troops through provision of financial and logistical support could bolster the moral of the troops to regain territories that are currently controlled by Al-Shabaab.

The **Sahel region** recorded 57 attacks but resulted in the highest number of deaths (780) among all the epicentres. This demonstrates the sophistication and high lethality of groups that operates in the Sahel region particularly JNIM and ISGS. Majority of the attacks in the region occurred in the Liptako-Gourma region which continue to be a hotbeds of terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational organised crimes activities. The G5 Sahel forces, which have been battling terrorist groups will have to be rekindled to resume offensive operations against terrorists' groups. Resolving the political and leadership differences among troops contributing countries is now needed than ever to sustain the efforts of counter terrorism in the Sahel. The **Lake Chad Basin** recorded an increase in the number of attacks but a reduction in the number of deaths. There were 87 attacks that resulted in 395 deaths accounting for 5 deaths per attack, far lower than the Q2 rates. Majority of the attacks in the LCB concentrated in the North-eastern Nigeria states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, Far North Region of Cameroon, and Diffa region of Niger. The MNJTF and national armies of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon continue to achieve operational successes in LCB.

The frequency of ADF/ISCAP's attack in the **Great Lakes Region** increased, but the total deaths resulting from the attacks reduced as compared to the Q2. ADF/ISCAP and other violent extremist groups including M23 and CODECO continued their hostilities in the **Great Lakes Region**. The north Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces of the eastern DRC continue to drive terrorism and violent extremism incidents in the great Lakes Region. Preventing violent extremism in the region will require a concerted efforts to address the growing insecurity and atrocities caused by ADF/ISCAP and other violent extremists' groups such as Mai-Mai, CODECO, and M23 which has been declared a terrorist group by the Congolese government.

In all, 71% of all attacks and 88% of all deaths for the period occurred in the epicentres. This higher than the 67% of all attacks and 86% of all deaths that occurred in the above-mentioned epicentres for the Q2.

25. Counter-Terrorism Response

Security forces across the continent despite suffering a significant number of casualties sustained their deliberate and planned counter terrorism operations against terrorist groups along their operational theatre and mobility corridors. In the Sahel, the Malian Armed Forces (FaMA), the Burkina Faso Défense forces, and the army of Niger intensified its counter offensive against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates within the Sahel particularly JNIM, ISGS and Ansaroul Islam. The intensification of the CT operation through air and ground operations resulted in the elimination and neutralisation of terrorist elements belonging to JNIM and ISGS. Mali remained central in the scheme of counter terrorism operations in the Sahel. Given that terrorist activities in Burkina Faso have deteriorated despite great momentum of the security forces, a coordinated response is required by all states including those in coastal west Africa to defeat insurgents in the Sahel to further prevent the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism into the littoral states.

In the Lake Chad Basin, MNJTF continued its offensive and achieved some operational successes against ISWAP and Boko Haram. The extension of MNJTF mandate, while providing it with the necessary logistical and financial resources is expected further weaken the momentum and cohesion of terrorists in LCB. In the east and Horn of Africa, the resumption of US AFRICOM CT operations, the renewed counter terrorism offensive attacks by the Somali National Army and the continues air and ground operations by the AMISOM/ATMIS have resulted in some operational successes against Al-Shabaab and ISS in Somalia. The Kenya Defense Forces and the Ethiopia Defense Forces also degraded Al-shabaab capabilities within their territories. In Northern Mozambique, coordination between SAMIM, Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) and Rwandan Forces is reiterated. The deployed troops must be well coordinated and cooperated to successfully defeat the insurgent groups.

In all 1,772 terrorists were neutralised in deliberate CT operations, in addition to the 616 killed in reprisal attacks, bringing the total number of terrorists eliminated within the period to 2,388 higher than those eliminated in the Q2. The need for CT operations to be conducted in compliance with regional and international humanitarian laws and frameworks as well as respect for human rights must be vigorously pursued to ensure the protection civilians population in such counter offensive operations. While CT operations achieved the desired results against terrorist groups, a number of security forces released statements admitting to erroneously causing casualties to civilian populations. This situation must be assessed to avoid future occurrence.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAY FORWARD

Terrorist and violent extremist activities continued unabated across the continent as shown by data gathered by the ACSRT for the third quarter (Q3). During the period under review terrorist attacks increased by 21% and the number of deaths declined by 8% as compared to the second quarter (Q2). The increase in terrorist attacks and correspondent deaths are consistent with previous months except for Q3 which witnessed a decline in the number of deaths.

The deteriorating terrorism situation in Africa that is increasingly becoming transnational, calls for accurate and timely sharing of information and intelligence as important tools to prevent and counter the growing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. Terrorists are forever strengthening their capabilities and refining their modus operandi, by adapting to challenging situations and acquiring material that could assist them in the operations. The groups, particularly al-Shabaab, appear to be in possession of drones that they use to conduct and coordinate attacks. Also, in West Africa, the use of IEDs by terrorist groups has increased thus strongly conveying newly learnt skills. In response, to effectively address the developing trend, Member States should strengthen the capabilities of security forces by adequately equipping them. It was noted that IED has been the dominant weapon against critical infrastructure and other ancillary public structures. A case in point is the destruction of bridges in Nare and Wousse connecting major towns. In order to reduce the risks against critical infrastructure, Member States, should develop comprehensive counter-IED programs, IED Awareness programs as well as protecting vulnerable targets through human and technological means. In this regard, cooperation with regional, continental and international bodies would be needed.

The expansion of threat from the Sahel region towards the Gulf of Guinea countries, raises concerns about the IS ability to gain foothold in the region. The Accra Initiative could be the coastal states' preventative mechanism to spearhead the fight against terrorism.

While there is no end in sight in the events in the Sahel, the situation in the Great Lakes region remains same with ADF/ISCAP and CODECO appearing unrelenting coupled with the clashes between the governments of DRC and Rwanda worsening the overall security situation in the region which may have a cascading effect on the security situation in the DRC and neighboring countries.

Spillover of terrorism and violent extremism continues to new areas. During the reporting period, Boko Haram/ISWAP continued its attacks beyond the Lake Chad Basin region. This uninhibited expansion into new areas would thus prove difficult for the MNJTF in the fight against the Boko Haram terrorists if the Task Force does not revise its mandate and extend its area of operation to pursue Boko Haram, wheresoever. In Mozambique, Eráti district of Nampula province recorded its first attacks during the reporting period. The counter-terrorism forces should revise their strategy and perhaps consider surrounding the enemy to deny them space to retract to neighbouring provinces of Cabo Delgado.

Despite the ongoing counter terrorism efforts by Member States and International Partners in collaboration with AUMS, the situation remains the same. Given the prevailing conditions and as echoed by the ACSRT, it is imperative that kinetic military approaches are considered together with local community based preventing violent extremism in a bid to defeat terrorism on the continent. Initiatives such as community policing should be encouraged to provide early warning in identifying terrorists or suspicious movement of people and goods. The initiatives could also be used to raise awareness on terrorism and violent extremism within local communities.